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Abstract
Although moral relativists often appeal to cases of apparent moral disagreement 
between members of different communities to motivate their view, accounting for 
these exchanges as evincing genuine disagreements constitutes a challenge to the 
coherence of moral relativism. While many moral relativists acknowledge this prob-
lem, attempts to solve it so far have been wanting. In response, moral relativists 
either give up the claim that there can be moral disagreement between members of 
different communities or end up with a view on which these disagreements have no 
“epistemic significance” because they are always faultless. This paper introduces an 
alternative strategy: accounting for disagreement in terms of “metalinguistic nego-
tiation”. It argues that this strategy constitutes a better solution to the challenge dis-
agreement poses for moral relativists because it leads to a nuanced understanding 
of the epistemic significance of moral disagreement between members of different 
communities. The upshot is a novel account of disagreement for moral relativists 
that has consequences for how moral relativism should be understood.
1 Introduction
Imagine two people disagreeing about whether eating animals is morally wrong. 
Now, assume that they live their lives in very different contexts, shaped by differ-
ent practices that imply different moral norms. Perhaps these distinct sets of moral 
norms are connected to different religions or even to different conceptions of 
humans’ relationship to nature. Suppose that one day they meet and–perhaps with 
the help of a translator–become aware of their conflict. They engage in a dispute, 
but the differences in their outlooks make it difficult to reach a shared understanding 
and so their disagreement remains unresolved. This is the kind of scenario moral 
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relativists often appeal to in order to motivate their view. However, it also seems 
that disagreements like the one described above have “epistemic significance”; that 
is, they give us reason to reconsider our views (cf. Carter, 2014). It is often assumed 
that this is because they indicate that a mistake has been made. But if whenever two 
people engage in a moral disagreement one of them must be wrong, then it cannot 
be the case that there are different and conflicting moral systems, each of which 
determining what is morally required in its own context. Therefore, although moral 
relativists often appeal to exchanges like the one in the example in order to motivate 
their view, at the same time, accounting for these exchanges as evincing genuine 
disagreements constitutes a challenge to the coherence of moral relativism.
In response to this problem, moral relativists have either given up the claim 
that moral disputes between members of different communities constitute genuine 
disagreements or argued that these disagreements have no epistemic significance 
because they are always faultless. These solutions come at a cost. Exchanges like 
the one about whether eating animals is morally wrong seem to constitute genu-
ine disagreements and–as opposed to e.g. disagreements about whether licorice is 
tasty–they seem to have epistemic significance. In this paper, I will argue that moral 
relativists are better off adopting a different strategy, namely, explaining disagree-
ment in terms of what David Plunkett and Tim Sundell call “metalinguistic negotia-
tion” (Plunkett & Sundell, 2013). The main advantage of this strategy is that it leads 
to a nuanced understanding of the epistemic significance of moral disagreements 
between members of different communities.
I will begin by detailing why accounting for moral disagreement between mem-
bers of different communities constitutes a challenge for moral relativists (Sect. 2). 
Then, I will discuss three different strategies moral relativists have relied on to meet 
this challenge: giving up disagreement, arguing for faultless disagreement based on 
semantic relativism, and explaining disagreement in terms of hybrid-expressivism 
(Sect.  3). Subsequently, I will introduce an alternative strategy–explaining moral 
disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation–and argue that it has distinc-
tive advantages (Sect.  4). Finally, I will address an objection to the assumption 
that moral disagreements between members of different communities are ordinar-
ily taken to have epistemic significance (Sect.  5). I conclude by summarizing my 
argument and discussing a consequence it has for how moral relativism should be 
understood.
2  Disagreement as a Challenge for Moral Relativism
Because both “relativism” and “disagreement” are contentious notions, to see why 
disagreement poses a challenge for moral relativists, they need to be clarified. By 
“moral relativism”, I mean any position in metaethics that commits to the following 
set of claims (cf. Kusch, 2016a, 107f; 2016b, 34f):
What morality permits and requires is relative to a given system of moral 
norms (Dependence).
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There are, have been or at least could be more than one such moral system 
(Plurality).
These different moral systems lead to conflicting verdicts (Exclusiveness).
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which they are on a par (Symmetry).
My discussion will be restricted to versions of “moral group relativism”; i.e., to ver-
sions of moral relativism that take the relevant system of moral norms to be shared 
by a community rather than specific to an individual. Influential examples include 
the views of Gilbert Harman, Carol Rovane, J. David Velleman and David B. Wong 
(Harman, 1975, 1996; Rovane, 2013; Velleman, 2015; Wong, 2006).
As it stands, the moral relativist’s commitment to Symmetry is most in need of 
elaboration. It is sometimes understood in terms of the claim that all different moral 
systems are “equally valid”, in the sense that any one of them is as good as any other 
(Equal Validity). However, this is a highly controversial claim. For one, it is implau-
sible that any imaginable moral system would be as good as any other. Moreover, 
in the context of the moral relativist’s other commitments, it remains unclear from 
what perspective the claim that all systems are “equally valid” can be made, as this 
claim seems to presuppose the kind of absolute standard the moral relativist denies 
exists. Therefore, Equal Validity is sometimes taken to be a commitment of relativ-
ism by opponents rather than proponents of the view. Because my argument about 
how moral relativists can explain moral disagreement has consequences for this 
question, I will return to the question of whether moral relativists are in fact commit-
ted to Equal Validity below (Sect. 4).
Because it correlates with their commitment to Dependence, moral relativ-
ists often commit to a contextualist semantics for moral judgments. According to 
semantic contextualism, the content of an utterance is relative to context, so that 
e.g. if someone utters “Eating animals is morally wrong”, according to a contextu-
alist semantics for moral judgments, what they are really expressing is that eating 
animals is morally wrong according to set of moral standards S, where S is a con-
textually salient set of moral standards, usually the set of moral standards accepted 
by the speaker.1 While Harman suggests a version of contextualism that postulates 
additional argument-places for moral expressions (Harman, 1975, 10; cf. 1996, 43), 
Velleman argues that they are akin to indexicals (Velleman, 2015, 77). Wong and 
Rovane commit to semantic contextualism in the broad sense that the meaning of 
moral expressions differs with context (Wong, 2006, 72; Rovane, 2013, 45).2
1 Not all versions of semantic contextualism for moral judgments relativize the content of an utterance to 
a set of moral standards. Gunnar Björnsson and Stephen Finlay e.g. defend a version of contextualism for 
moral judgments as relativized to information (as well as standards) (Björnsson and Finlay, 2010).
2 While the relativization of content to context of utterance offered by semantic contextualism is of spe-
cial interest to moral relativists, there is no entailment in either direction. Rather, different metaethical 
positions can be combined with different accounts of the semantics of moral judgments. This is because 
moral relativism’s commitment to Dependence underdetermines semantic options (Silk, 2018, 105) and 
there might be reasons to allow for semantic context-sensitivity, even if the parameter supplied does not 
vary (Stojanovic, 2018, 126). An alternative semantic proposal that is of similar interest to moral relativ-
ists is semantic relativism. I discuss semantic relativism in Sect. 3.2.
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Any definition of moral disagreement needs to address two obstacles. For one, 
the ordinary notion of a disagreement is ambiguous between an activity–the activ-
ity of engaging in a disagreement with someone–and a state–the state of being in 
disagreement with someone (Cappelen & Hawthorne, 2009, 60f; MacFarlane, 2014, 
119). These two notions can come apart. It is both possible to be in a state of disa-
greement without ever discovering it and to engage in the activity of disagreeing 
based on a misunderstanding. Moreover, while it might seem tempting to define 
moral disagreement in terms of a conflict in beliefs, in the context of metaethics, this 
would beg the question against noncognitivsm. According to noncognitivists, moral 
judgments do not express doxastic attitudes such as belief, but rather non-doxastic 
attitudes such as approval. On this view, moral disagreements cannot consist in a 
clash of beliefs because moral judgments do not express beliefs in the first place. To 
address these obstacles, I will adopt the following definition of disagreement as a 
state of holding conflicting (doxastic or non-doxastic) attitudes (cf. Plunkett & Sun-
dell, 2013, 11):
A and B are in a state of disagreement if and only if A holds attitude X and B 
holds attitude Y and X and Y are “rationally incompatible”, in the sense that A 
could not adopt Y (and B could not adopt X) without ending up with an inco-
herent set of attitudes.3
Following Plunkett and Sundell, I will refer to any exchange that appears to 
express a disagreement as a “dispute” (Plunkett & Sundell, 2013, 6). According to 
this definition, many disputes might turn out to express no genuine disagreement 
at all, but instead rest on a misunderstanding. While all disputes that are not based 
on a misunderstanding will be due to a state of disagreement, not all states of disa-
greement give rise to a meaningful dispute. Therefore, in addition to identifying a 
conflict in attitudes, giving a satisfactory account of a given exchange as constituting 
a genuine disagreement requires identifying a pragmatic point of engaging in the 
dispute.
The type of disagreement at issue in the debate on moral group relativism is 
“moral inter-group disagreement”, i.e., disagreement about moral questions that 
occurs between members of different communities (rather than “moral intra-group 
disagreement”, i.e., moral disagreement between members of the same commu-
nity). The relevant disagreements are “irreducibly” moral, in the sense that they are 
not due to disagreements about non-moral issues.4 Moral relativists often motivate 
their position by arguing that it presents the best explanation for the existence of 
3 As John MacFarlane has pointed out, this criterion could turn out to be vacuous in case A and B are 
already committed to an incoherent set of attitudes (MacFarlane, 2014, 121, n4). However, this potential 
problem can be circumvented by specifying that A and B would end up with an incoherent set of atti-
tudes solely in virtue of simultaneously holding X and Y.
4 That the relevant disagreement cannot be reduced to disagreement about non-moral questions need not 
mean that it is “fundamental” or “deep”, i.e., it need not be due to disagreement about fundamental prin-
ciples (cf. Fogelin, 2005; Kinzel and Kusch, 2018; Lavorerio, 2018). Instead, it might be based e.g. on 
how shared principles are interpreted, the use of different “thick concepts” or other details of the respec-
tive moral systems.
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wide-spread moral disputes between members of different communities that remain 
persistently unresolved. At the same time, however, accounting for the disputes they 
appeal to in order to motivate their view as constituting genuine disagreements pre-
sents a challenge for moral relativists. This challenge is due to the “epistemic sig-
nificance” of disagreements. Disagreements have epistemic significance because 
they give us reason to reconsider–if not revise or even reject–our position. They 
prompt us to see our view in a new light, gather more evidence and engage in a dis-
pute. Because they can thereby lead to an improved state of overall attitudes, disa-
greements are often taken to have an important epistemological function (cf. e.g. 
Rovane, 2013, 21).
Suppose that five friends go out to eat at a restaurant and decide to split the bill 
evenly. They do the math in their heads and one of them becomes confident that their 
shares are $43 each. However, they then learn that their friend has also done the cal-
culation and has become confident that their shares are $45 each (Christensen, 2007, 
193). In this case, it seems clear that the disagreement gives both disputants reason 
to reconsider their view and can thereby lead to an improved overall epistemic situ-
ation.5 However, the epistemic significance of disagreement comes in degrees and 
differs for different domains. Whereas disagreements about the outcome of a calcu-
lation ought to prompt us to reconsider our views, other disagreements, such as e.g. 
about whether licorice is tasty, need not do so. While the epistemic significance of 
moral disagreements might not always be as high as that of disagreements about the 
outcome of a calculation–especially when it occurs between members of different 
communities–it seems to at least be higher than that of disagreements about taste.6
It is often assumed that disagreements have epistemic significance because they 
show us that something has gone wrong in the sense that at least one of the dis-
putants (but possibly both) must be mistaken. While the assumption that disagree-
ment always indicates that a mistake has been made is stronger than the claim that 
disagreement has epistemic significance, it is difficult to see why disagreement in 
an area of discourse would give us reason to reconsider our views if it is always 
faultless. Therefore, the claim that disagreement has epistemic significance plausi-
bly requires that disagreement indicates that it is at least possible that a mistake has 
been made. An argument that supports the view that disagreement always indicates 
5 While the question of how exactly one ought to react to a disagreement in case the other disputant is an 
“epistemic peer” is discussed in the literature on peer disagreement, the claim that disagreement ought to 
prompt us to reconsider our attitude is compatible with all views in this debate and also covers cases in 
which a disputant is not considered an epistemic peer. Registering a disagreement and deciding that one 
will stick to one’s position because the one who disputes it is in no epistemic position to back up their 
claim is a way of reconsidering and thus at least potentially an apt reaction to the epistemic significance 
of disagreement.
6 Similar takes on the characteristic of moral disagreements in contrast to disagreements about taste 
include Crispin Wright’s claim that moral disputes are not normally regarded as “disputes of inclination” 
(Wright, 2012, 449), Delia Belleri’s argument that disagreements about taste do not have epistemic sig-
nificance and therefore do not license disputes (Belleri, 2014, 298), as well as Ragnar Francén’s distinc-
tion between “unstable” intuitions of disagreement (which we have in cases of disagreements about taste) 




that a mistake has been made is Crispin Wright’s “simple deduction”. This argument 
takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum based on the premises “A accepts P”, “B 
accepts Not-P” and “A’s and B’s disagreement involves no mistake” (Wright, 2006, 
41; 2001, 56). It relies on the assumption that believing something false amounts 
to committing a mistake. With this assumption in place, it appears that either P, in 
which case B would have committed a mistake, or not-P, in which case A would 
have committed a mistake.7
The assumption that disagreement indicates mistake underlies the challenge disa-
greement poses for moral relativists. If disagreements always indicate that a mis-
take has been made and moral disputes between members of different communities 
constitute genuine disagreements, then whenever members of different communities 
disagree about a moral question, one of them must be wrong. This is incompatible 
with the moral relativist’s commitment to Symmetry, according to which different 
moral systems are on a par.8 However, if moral disputes between members of dif-
ferent communities do not constitute genuine disagreements, then it seems that the 
disputants’ claims do not conflict. This is incompatible with the moral relativist’s 
commitment to Exclusiveness, according to which different moral systems lead to 
conflicting verdicts. The challenge thus takes the form of a dilemma:
Either moral disputes between members of different communities constitute 
genuine disagreements, then at least one of the disputants must be mistaken 
(so Symmetry does not hold) (horn 1); or moral disputes between members 
of different communities do not constitute genuine disagreements, then their 
views are compatible (so Exclusiveness does not hold) (horn 2).
The problem lies in that, whichever way one goes, one has to give up one of 
the elements of moral relativism. But without taking a coherent stance on whether 
moral disputes between members of different communities constitute genuine dis-
agreements, it becomes unclear whether moral relativists can rely on examples of 
unresolved moral disputes in order to motivate their view.9
7 The reasoning underlying the “simple deduction” creates a problem in the context of Wright’s attempt 
to appeal to the criterion of “cognitive command”–roughly, whether disagreement in an area of discourse 
indicates mistake (Wright, 1992, 92f)–in order to distinguish between areas of discourse for which a real-
ist account is appropriate and areas of discourse for which an anti-realist account is appropriate. Wright’s 
discussion shows that there is a close connection between the idea that disagreement must imply mistake 
and the idea that a certain area of discourse is a matter of objective fact. Relativism about a given area of 
discourse is usually taken to presuppose that that area of discourse is not a matter of objective fact. This 
gives the relativist some leeway to deny an important presupposition underlying the challenge that I will 
explore in the next section.
8 While I have left open for the time being whether moral relativists are committed to Symmetry in the 
sense of Equal Validity, the assumption that disagreement always indicates mistake threatens to under-
mine any plausible version of Symmetry, including the one I will ultimately argue the moral relativist 
should subscribe to.
9 Because many moral relativists are semantic contextualists, they face an additional obstacle in account-
ing for disagreement, the so-called “problem of lost disagreement”. If by uttering “Eating animals is 
morally wrong” A claims that eating animals is morally wrong according to set of moral standards S1 
and by uttering “eating animals is not morally wrong” B claims that eating animals is not morally wrong 
according to set of moral standards  S2, then the contents they express are not rationally incompatible. 
While their dispute intuitively seems to evince a genuine disagreement, this disagreement is “lost” on a 
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The challenge disagreement poses for moral relativists thus takes the form of an 
apparent dilemma that relies on several assumptions about disagreement. While the 
first horn of the dilemma relies on the assumption that disagreement always indi-
cates that a mistake has been made, the second horn relies on the assumption that 
whenever two people hold incompatible attitudes, they are in a state of disagree-
ment. However, these assumptions can be disputed. In the next section, I will dis-
cuss three different strategies moral relativists have relied on to escape the dilemma 
and argue that they face severe limitations.
3  Disagreement: Lost, Faultless, and Hybrid
3.1  Giving up Disagreement
One way to react to the challenge disagreement poses for moral relativists is simply 
to accept that while the disputes that moral relativists appeal to in order to motivate 
their view seem to constitute genuine moral disagreements, in fact, they don’t, and 
argue that the disputants’ views are nevertheless incompatible. This strategy depends 
on denying the assumption that whenever two people hold incompatible attitudes, 
they are in a state of disagreement. Rovane and Velleman both pursue this strategy 
(Rovane, 2013, 30; Velleman, 2015, 2, 55). This allows them to avoid the dilemma 
stated above: They can argue that moral disputes between members of different 
communities do not constitute genuine disagreements (so Symmetry holds), yet 
their views are incompatible (so Exclusiveness holds). However, the required kind 
of incompatibility is not easy to specify in a coherent and plausible way. Rovane and 
Velleman give different explanations for why, although disputes between members 
of different communities cannot constitute genuine disagreements, the disputants’ 
views are nevertheless incompatible. While according to Rovane, their views cannot 
be conjoined because they do not stand in any logical relations and are thus “norma-
tively insulated” (Rovane, 2013, 113), Velleman argues that there remains a “practi-
cal disagreement” (Velleman, 2015, 76). Neither of these solutions is fully satisfac-
tory. Rovane’s version of the strategy requires substantive revisionary assumptions 
about logic that seem ad hoc in the context at hand and while Velleman hints at the 
possibility of understanding disagreement differently, he does not explore it. Given 
the definition of disagreement introduced above, a successful defense of this strategy 
would have to either locate conflict in something other than a rational incompat-
ibility of (doxastic or non-doxastic) attitudes or explain why this sort of conflict is 
insufficient for disagreement. This seems difficult to achieve. Moreover, this solution 
contextualist interpretation. Because the authors I focus on defend versions of moral group relativism, 
they commit to versions of “semantic group contextualism” that take the contextually salient set of moral 
standards to be shared by a community rather than accepted by the speaker alone. Group contextualism is 
sometimes seen as a solution to the problem of lost disagreement from the perspective of contextualism 
(see e.g. Silk, 2017, 212). However, while group contextualism solves the problem at the level of intra-




comes at a cost because disputes between members of different communities seem 
to indicate genuine disagreements. The strategy thus requires an “error theory” that 
explains why disputes between members of different communities seem to evince 
genuine disagreements and are treated as such, although they do not in fact consti-
tute disagreements.
3.2  Faultless Disagreement
Another option for moral relativists to react to the challenge is to argue that while 
disputes between members of different communities do constitute genuine moral 
disagreements, this does not mean that one of the disputants must be mistaken. That 
is, they can argue that the relevant disagreement is “faultless”. This strategy depends 
on rejecting the assumption that disagreement must always indicate that a mistake 
has been made. One way to render the notion of a faultless disagreement coherent is 
by adopting a relativist semantics for moral judgments. While according to semantic 
contextualism, the content of an utterance is relative to context, according to seman-
tic relativism, the content remains un-relativized, but the truth-value is relative to 
context. Thus, according to a relativist semantics for moral judgments, if someone 
utters “Eating animals is morally wrong” what they are really expressing is that eat-
ing animals is morally wrong, but whether this is true or false is relative to some 
contextually salient set of moral standards S, which is determined by the context of 
utterance, usually the set of moral standards accepted by the speaker.10 This makes 
it possible to account for faultless disagreement: if by uttering “Eating animals is 
morally wrong” A claims that eating animals is morally wrong and this is true rela-
tive to their set of standards or “perspective” and by uttering “Eating animals is not 
morally wrong” B claims that eating animals is not morally wrong and this is true 
relative to their perspective, then A and B disagree, yet their disagreement involves 
no mistake (cf. Kölbel, 2004, 70).11
Max Kölbel defends a version of moral group relativism that is based on a 
sophisticated form of semantic relativism (Kölbel, 2005). From the point of view 
of moral group relativists that commit to a contextualist semantics for moral judg-
ments, adopting this strategy would require a revision of their semantic commit-
ments. However, doing so would allow them to avoid the dilemma. They can argue 
that moral disputes between members of different communities constitute genuine 
10 An alternative version of semantic relativism takes the relevant set of standards to be determined by 
the “context of assessment”, in which an utterance is assessed (MacFarlane, 2014). However, the dif-
ference between these versions of semantic relativism do not matter for the purposes of my argument. 
While MacFarlane rejects the notion of a “faultless disagreement” as unhelpful, his view implies that dis-
agreement is faultless in the sense I take to be relevant–in his terminology, that attitudes that are “doxas-
tically non-cotenable” can both be “accurate” and not in violation of constitutive norms governing belief 
and assertion (MacFarlane, 2014, 133–36).
11 Other possibilities to render the notion of faultless disagreement coherent include adopting non-clas-
sical logics, such as intuitionism (Wright, 2001) or dialetheism (Odrowąż-Sypniewska, 2013). I will not 
consider these variants in any detail because they face severe difficulties (Wright, 2006, 48–50; Kölbel, 
2004, 60–62; Priest, 2013, 94).
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disagreements based on a conflict in attitudes (so Exclusiveness holds): While A 
believes (and asserts) that eating animals is morally wrong, B believes (and asserts) 
that eating animals is not morally wrong.12 Yet, these disagreements are faultless 
because what A and B believe (and assert) is true relative to their respective per-
spectives (so Symmetry holds). Of course, there is a sense in which the incompat-
ibility disappears when each belief (or assertion) is considered as true relative to the 
perspective of the speaker. While this does not undermine the point that adopting 
a relativist semantics allows the moral relativist to identify a conflict in attitudes, 
it has bearing on whether it allows the moral relativist to account for a pragmatic 
point of the dispute. If we assume that disputants are aware of the norms govern-
ing their assertions–according to which they ought to believe and assert a claim if 
it is true relative to their perspective–and that they aim at having true beliefs and 
making true assertions, it becomes unclear why they should bother engaging in the 
dispute. However, semantic relativists can provide additional considerations that 
explain why engaging in the dispute has a pragmatic point. Alternatively, they could 
settle for an “error theory” that explains why some disagreements, such as moral 
disagreements, seem to have a pragmatic point and disputants take them to have one, 
although–according to a relativist semantics–there is none.
In any case, I will not take issue with the claim that semantic relativists can 
account for disagreement here. Rather, I want to focus on a different but related 
consequence of this strategy. On an account of moral inter-group disagreement in 
terms of semantic relativism, these disagreements have no epistemic significance. 
This is because–as long as disputants say something that is true according to their 
own perspective–these disagreements are faultless. Finding oneself in a disagree-
ment with someone who holds a different perspective thus provides no indication 
about whether one has committed a mistake relative to one’s own standards. This is 
problematic because moral disagreements are often treated as having (at least some) 
epistemic significance–even if they occur across great spatial and temporal dis-
tance–and engaging in them can serve an important epistemological function. The 
strategy thus requires an “error theory” that explains why it would be a mistake to 
treat moral disagreements as having epistemic significance; yet accepting such an 
error theory would make one unable to account for the epistemically constructive 
role engaging in an argument about e.g. whether eating animals is morally wrong 
can play in processes of attitude-revision.13
13 On a semantic relativist view, disagreements thus have no epistemic significance because (given that 
each disputant is right about what is true relative to their set of standards) they are always faultless, in the 
sense that each disputant is believing (asserting) something that is true relative to their perspective. How-
ever, what about a different notion of mistake, according to which there might be something wrong with 
the perspectives endorsed by the disputants themselves? Appealing to such a notion of mistake would 
bring the semantic relativist strategy closer to the strategy I will ultimately argue for. I will discuss the 
implications of this strategy in detail in Sect. 4.
12 This is often taken to be a main advantage of semantic relativism over semantic contextualism (see 
e.g. MacFarlane, 2014, Chapter 6).
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3.3  Hybrid‑Expressivist Disagreement
A third way to react to the challenge disagreement poses for moral relativists is to 
argue that while disputes between members of different communities do not consti-
tute disagreements in terms of the doxastic attitudes expressed, they constitute disa-
greements in terms of the non-doxastic attitudes expressed. This requires adopting 
additional expressivist semantic commitments, according to which the function of 
moral judgments is not to make claims about how things are, but to express attitudes 
of the speaker. Combined with the contextualist semantic commitments moral rela-
tivists already undertake, this leads to a hybrid-expressivist view, on which moral 
judgments have both representational and non-representational functions. Harman 
and Wong have both suggested variants of this kind of solution. Wong introduces 
a distinction between conflict over what is true, which presupposes that disputants 
use moral expressions with the same meaning, and another kind of conflict that is 
“illocutionary and pragmatic and is made possible by the action-guiding functions 
of morality” (Wong, 2006, 77). He takes this to show that “noncognitivists’ analy-
ses of moral concepts are partly correct” (Wong, 2006, 72). In a similar vein, Har-
man explores what he calls a “quasi-absolutist” semantics, according to which moral 
relativists can use non-relativized moral expressions in a “quasi-absolutist” way to 
“express the speaker’s attitude toward certain standards” (Harman, 1996, 35). He 
takes this to be a further development of emotivism (Harman, 1996, 34).
In order for this “hybrid-expressivist” strategy to avoid the dilemma, it has to be 
assumed that the non-doxastic attitudes expressed do not answer to unique standards 
of correctness. Otherwise, even conflict in non-doxastic attitudes would indicate 
that a mistake has been made. In other words, if the additional expressivist semantic 
commitments take a “quasi-realist” form that can account for the truth-functional 
behavior of moral discourse, even though the judgments themselves are not taken 
to be truth-apt, Wright’s “simple deduction” could be reformulated in terms of non-
doxastic attitudes (see also Kölbel, 2004, 65f). Therefore, the disagreement on the 
level of conflicting non-doxastic attitudes must be faultless. Thus, ultimately, this 
strategy also depends on rejecting the assumption that disagreement must always 
indicate that a mistake has been made. Adopting it allows the moral relativist to 
avoid the dilemma: They can argue that while moral disputes between members of 
different communities constitute genuine disagreements based on an incompatibility 
of non-doxastic attitudes (so Exclusiveness holds), these disagreements are faultless 
(so Symmetry holds).
Because any successful variant of this strategy has strong similarities to account-
ing for disagreement as faultless based on semantic relativism, its costs and benefits 
are similar as well. From the point of view of moral relativists that commit to a con-
textualist semantics of moral judgments, explaining disagreement in terms of hybrid-
expressivism requires adopting additional and controversial semantic commitments. 
While doing so would allow the moral relativist to identify a conflict in attitudes, 
as in the case of faultless disagreement based on semantic relativism, it is less clear 
whether it can vindicate a pragmatic point to the disagreement if disputants were 
fully informed. This is because, unless there are standards of correctness for atti-
tudes, it is unclear whether it would make sense to engage in a disagreement at the 
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level of those attitudes. At least more would have to be said to explain why engaging 
in this kind of disagreement has a point. Most importantly, because according to 
an explanation of moral inter-group disagreement in terms of hybrid-expressivism 
these disagreements are always faultless, it also implies that moral inter-group disa-
greements have no epistemic significance. This is problematic because it is in ten-
sion with ordinary attitudes towards moral disagreements and cannot account for the 
constructive role disagreement can play for attitude-revision.14
There are, thus, two main ways to respond to the challenge the phenomenon of 
moral inter-group disagreement poses for moral group relativists. The moral relativ-
ist can (i) either insist that moral disputes between members of different communi-
ties constitute genuine disagreements but deny that this means that at least one of 
them must be mistaken or (ii) give up the claim that moral disputes between mem-
bers of different communities constitute genuine disagreements but deny that this 
means that their positions are compatible. While the former type of strategy man-
ages to retain disagreement, but only at the cost of losing its epistemic significance, 
the latter gives up disagreement and has a hard time reconciling lack of disagree-
ment with incompatibility between attitudes. In the next section, I will introduce an 
alternative strategy–accounting for moral inter-group disagreement in terms of what 
Plunkett and Sundell call “metalinguistic negotiation”–and argue that it has distinc-
tive advantages.
4  Moral Inter‑Group Disagreement as Metalinguistic Negotiation
In developing the notion of a “metalinguistic negotiation”, Plunkett and Sundell 
draw on Chris Barker’s idea of “metalinguistic usage” that can be illustrated by way 
of an example. The expression “X is tall” is usually used in order to communicate 
information about someone’s height. Assuming a contextualist analysis of gradable 
adjectives, this is achieved by implicitly referring to a contextually salient standard 
(a threshold for being tall). However, as Barker has pointed out, in a situation in 
which X is nearby and in plain view, it is equally possible to use the expression “X 
is tall” in order to communicate information about the contextually salient threshold 
for being tall. This would amount to a metalinguistic use of “X is tall” that exploits 
common knowledge about someone’s height in order to communicate something 
about the context (Barker, 2002, 1f). Drawing on this insight, Plunkett and Sundell 
consider what would happen if a dispute were to occur in the situation at hand. They 
argue that this dispute would center on the contextually salient threshold for being 
tall rather than X’s height and would thus also be metalinguistic. They further dis-
tinguish cases in which there is a matter of fact about what the relevant contextually 
salient standard is and cases in which the dispute centers on what the standard ought 
14 Like the semantic relativist, the hybrid-expressivist could in principle appeal to a different notion of 
mistake that consists in endorsing the wrong set of standards. This would make this strategy similar to 
the strategy I will argue for and discuss below.
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to be. They call the latter kind of cases “metalinguistic negotiations” (Plunkett & 
Sundell, 2013, 3).
Adopting this notion of disagreement allows the moral relativist to account for 
moral inter-group disagreement while remaining committed to semantic contextu-
alism for moral judgments. On a contextualist semantics for moral judgments, by 
uttering “Eating animals is morally wrong” A claims that eating animals is morally 
wrong according to set of moral standards S1 and by uttering “Eating animals is 
not morally wrong” B claims that eating animals is not morally wrong according 
to set of moral standards S2. The contents they literally express are thus rationally 
compatible. Nevertheless, the dispute constitutes a genuine disagreement because A 
and B are using their utterances metalinguistically in order to pragmatically advo-
cate for their respective parameter settings. While A commits to and communicates 
the content that “morally wrong” should be used with reference to set of standards 
S1 (according to which eating animals is morally wrong), B commits to and com-
municates the content that “morally wrong” should be used with reference to set of 
moral standards S2 (according to which eating animals is not morally wrong). While 
this kind of disagreement could be carried out explicitly, it can also be carried out 
implicitly, via the mechanism of metalinguistic negotiation.
Explaining disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation thus allows the 
moral relativist to identify a conflict in attitudes: namely, the disputants have incon-
sistent views on how the expression “morally wrong” should be used.15 In addition, 
adopting this strategy allows the moral relativist to specify a pragmatic point of 
engaging in the dispute. Plunkett and Sundell emphasize that metalinguistic nego-
tiations constitute disagreements “worth having” because how we use words mat-
ters (Plunkett & Sundell, 2013, 22–24). This can be illustrated with respect to the 
examples Plunkett and Sundell provide, such as disputes about what should count as 
“spicy” when cooking together, what should count as “cold” in a shared office, what 
should count as “rich” when determining a tax-base (Plunkett & Sundell, 2013, 14f) 
and, perhaps most strikingly, whether to use the term “torture” in such a way that 
it includes waterboarding (Plunkett & Sundell, 2013, 19f).16 These cases show that 
metalinguistic negotiations can be closely connected to collective decision-mak-
ing regarding important normative issues. This is because they concern the use of 
expressions that play important “functional roles”. As Plunkett and Sundell put it, 
metalinguistic negotiations involving moral expressions constitute disagreements 
worth having because moral expressions “play a functional role that concerns mat-
ters of how we navigate our decisions about how to treat others, what to hold each 
15 This makes it possible to account for disagreement (as a state) also in cases where there is no shared 
context, such as moral inter-group disagreement across great temporal and spatial distance.
16 The range of examples shows that Plunkett and Sundell develop metalinguistic negotiation not only 
regarding context-sensitive expressions that are used with respect to different parameters but also regard-
ing terms that are paired with different concepts. Accounting for moral inter-group disagreement in terms 
of metalinguistic negotiation is thus available to moral relativists that commit to a version of contextual-
ism in the framework of formal semantics as well as to those that commit to semantic contextualism in 
the broad sense that moral expressions have different meanings in different contexts.
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other responsible for doing, and how to live more generally” (Plunkett & Sundell, 
2013, 20).17
While disputants could thus see a point in engaging in a dispute involving moral 
expressions if they were aware that it constitutes a metalinguistic negotiation, this 
does not mean that they are likely to accept this explanation. In fact, there is reason 
to assume that speakers who engage in a moral dispute would resist a characteriza-
tion of their exchange as being about language. One might thus object that explain-
ing moral inter-group disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation mis-
characterizes moral disagreements as being about language and comes at the cost 
of attributing a kind of “speaker error” concerning what moral disagreements are, 
in fact, about (cf. Plunkett & Sundell, 2019, 9). However, to explain moral inter-
group disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation, moral relativists need not 
claim that all moral disagreement is about language, but only that a special kind 
that occurs between members of different communities is.18 In these cases of disa-
greement, speakers use context-sensitive moral expressions with respect to different 
standards. It is implausible to assume that, even if this was the right view, speakers 
would be aware of this mechanism or could be easily made aware of it. As Plunkett 
and Sundell argue, even if speakers do turn out to have views of such intricate lin-
guistic matters–which seems unlikely–and these views were to contradict an expla-
nation in terms of metalinguistic negotiation, this would only commit the proponent 
of metalinguistic negotiation to the claim that speakers are wrong about “folk-lin-
guistics”, but not about how to use language. This kind of attribution of speaker 
error is less problematic as it does not serve to isolate a theory from potentially 
recalcitrant data about language use (Plunkett & Sundell, 2019, 14–19). Moreover, 
speaker’s reluctance to think of these disputes as metalinguistic can be accounted for 
(cf. Plunkett & Sundell, 2019, 21f). While disagreements that turn out to be “merely 
verbal” are often taken to be unimportant and not worth pursuing, moral disagree-
ments are often taken very seriously. However, as Plunkett and Sundell’s example of 
how to use the term “torture” elucidates, many linguistic disagreements are closely 
connected to practical matters and to disagreements that are not about language. 
17 As Plunkett and Sundell point out, this emphasis on the practical significance of how we use words 
closely connects their view of disagreement to “conceptual ethics” (see Burgess and Plunkett, 2013a; 
2013b). As will become clear below, the fact that they refer to the “functional role” of terms to elucidate 
the practical significance of how we use words will play an important role for my argument. A simi-
lar approach to conceptual ethics (or “conceptual engineering”) that also draws on the idea that words 
(or concepts) play a functional role is developed by Amie Thomasson, who attributes this type of view 
to Sally Haslanger (Haslanger, 2000; Thomasson, 2020). Herman Cappelen develops a critique of this 
notion of a functional role, which Thomasson engages with, but which is beyond the scope of this paper 
(Cappelen, 2018).
18 But is there also a positive reason why moral inter-group disagreements should be interpreted as met-
alinguistic negotiations? As Delia Belleri points out, considerations of charity can play an important role 
in arguing that a given exchange should be regarded as a metalinguistic negotiation (Belleri, 2020). From 
the point of view of a moral relativist committed to semantic contextualism, considerations of charity 
support interpreting moral inter-group disagreements as metalinguistic negotiations because otherwise 
the moral relativist would have to understand the disputants as talking past each other or (if they adopted 




Therefore, metalinguistic negotiations can be both about language and about impor-
tant normative issues.
Another worry associated with the pragmatic point of engaging in metalinguis-
tic negotiation is that it might seem to be in tension with central tenets of moral 
relativism. This is because the notion of metalinguistic negotiation seems to presup-
pose that disagreements are worth having because there is a requirement of practical 
coordination. This is suggested by the examples Plunkett and Sundell rely on, such 
as cooking chili together and heating a shared office, but also by the term “negotia-
tion” itself. One might thus object that, while moral relativism might be compatible 
with some degree of coordination between communities and overlap between dif-
ferent moral systems, it is certainly incompatible with a requirement of universal 
convergence. However, although this is in fact suggested by the majority of the cases 
Plunkett and Sundell discuss, as Sundell also notes, coordination is not the only 
pragmatic point engaging in a metalinguistic negotiation can have (Sundell, 2017, 
91). Alexander Davies argues that “identity display” constitutes another important 
motivation underlying metalinguistic negotiations. This is because how we use 
words can be a “marker” of social identity “and it is important to us that our social 
identities are seen and understood” (Davies, 2020, 2).19 The more general upshot is 
that engaging in a metalinguistic negotiation can have different points in different 
contexts. One point of engaging in moral disagreement is to try to learn from the 
other disputant even though coordination is not required. Explaining moral inter-
group disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation, thus, allows the moral 
relativist to specify a pragmatic point of engaging in these disputes that is compat-
ible with moral relativism.
At first sight, it might seem that–just as explaining disagreement in terms of 
semantic relativism or hybrid-expressivism–explaining moral inter-group disagree-
ment in terms of metalinguistic negotiation leads to a view on which moral inter-
group disagreement is faultless. This is because according to this explanation of 
moral inter-group disagreement, both disputants literally express something true. 
However, this is not the only, let alone the most interesting notion of faultlessness in 
the context of a contextualist semantics for moral judgments. As Plunkett and Sun-
dell emphasize, metalinguistic negotiations have a point because there is a substan-
tive question about which way of using a given expression is better in the context 
at hand. This is because the functional role expressions play provides a standard to 
assess a given use of a term as better or worse. Considering the example of some-
one who, while baking cupcakes, uses “tasty” with reference to a standard that is 
highly unsuitable given the functional role of this term, Sundell points out that such 
a person makes a mistake, even though they manage to express a true proposition 
(Sundell, 2016, 812). Thus, in contrast to other solutions that retain the claim that 
moral disputes between members of different communities constitute genuine disa-
greements, explaining moral inter-group disagreement as metalinguistic negotiation 
19 This kind of reasoning also helps to rebut another objection against accounts of disagreements in 
terms of metalinguistic negotiation in general: that in some of the target cases of disputes that seem to 
evince genuine disagreements no question of practical coordination is at stake (Zeman, 2017, 67).
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does not imply that this kind of disagreement is always faultless. This is because it 
appeals to a different notion of mistake, according to which someone can be at fault 
for using a context-sensitive expression with respect to a standard that is unsuita-
ble given the functional role of the term. It does, however, vindicate the possibility 
of faultless disagreement as a special case. Disagreement is faultless just in case 
the disputants use context-sensitive expressions with respect to standards that are 
equally suitable given the functional role of the relevant expression.20
Because explaining moral inter-group disagreement in terms of metalinguistic-
negotiation leads to a view on which moral inter-group disagreement can but need 
not be faultless, to see how it allows the moral relativist to avoid the dilemma, two 
different cases need to be considered. First, consider a case of moral inter-group 
disagreement in which the disputants use a moral expression with respect to moral 
standards that allow this term to fulfill its functional role equally well. In this case, 
the disagreement will be faultless in the relevant sense. Note that the disagreement 
will also be faultless in the sense that both disputants literally express something 
true; however, that is not the sense of faultlessness that is salient in the context at 
hand. Explaining the dispute in terms of metalinguistic negotiation allows the moral 
relativist to avoid the dilemma: They can argue that it evinces a genuine moral dis-
agreement based on rationally incompatible attitudes (so Exclusiveness holds), yet 
this disagreement is faultless (so Symmetry holds). Next, consider a case of moral 
inter-group disagreement in which one disputant uses a moral expression with 
respect to moral standards that allow this term to fulfill its functional role better 
than when it is used with respect to the standards the other disputant is appealing to. 
In this case, the disagreement will still be faultless in the sense that both disputants 
literally express something true. However, as noted above, this is not the sense of 
faultlessness relevant in the context at hand and it is not sufficient to vindicate Sym-
metry. This has consequences for the question whether this solution is compatible 
with the motivation underlying moral relativism.
The claim that the functional role of moral expressions provides a standard to 
assess a given use that refers to a set of moral standards as better or worse than 
another one implies that moral systems themselves can be assessed as better or 
worse. Moral relativists who adopt this strategy, thus, commit to Symmetry in the 
sense of Equal Validity only as a special case: moral systems are equally valid 
in case they fulfill the functional role of systems of moral norms equally well. 
Although the idea that moral systems fulfill a common function might be taken to be 
20 While disputants might also disagree about which of two competing uses allows a term to better fulfill 
its functional role as well as about what this functional role is, according to this view, these disagree-
ments need not and will often not be faultless. A parallel story can be given about faultless disagreement 
with respect to metalinguistic negotiations that do not involve context-sensitive expressions used with 
respect to different parameters, but terms used to denote different concepts. Plunkett and Sundell dis-
cuss the case of disputants disagreeing about whether “Waterboarding is torture”, where one disputant 
is assuming the United Nations definition of torture, according to which the statement is true, whereas 
the other disputant is using the U.S. Department of Justice definition, according to which it is false. They 
emphasize that, although both disputants manage to literally express a true proposition and are strictly 
speaking talking past each other, “there is a substantive question about which definition is better” (Plun-
kett and Sundell, 2013, 19).
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in tension with moral relativism, in fact, some versions of moral relativism–such as 
the views defended by Velleman and Wong–already commit to this idea (Velleman, 
2015, 97; Wong, 2006, 39f).21 Because it does allow for the possibility of faultless 
disagreement, explaining moral inter-group disagreement in terms of metalinguistic 
negotiation is compatible with the central motivation underlying moral relativism: 
the idea that different moral systems can require incompatible courses of action, yet 
both be genuinely valid in their respective context. However, while explaining moral 
inter-group disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation goes well with 
“functionalist” versions of moral relativism, it might indeed introduce an element of 
tension into other versions.
The strategy of explaining moral inter-group disagreement in terms of metalin-
guistic negotiation thus rejects the assumption that disagreement must always indi-
cate that a mistake has been made, which underlies the dilemma, but accepts that 
disagreement can sometimes indicate that a mistake has been made. Because, on 
this view, disagreement can but need not indicate that a mistake has been made, 
it implies that the epistemic significance of moral inter-group disagreement is 
nuanced. Moral inter-group disagreements give us reason to reconsider our view 
because they can be due to the fact that a mistake has been made (in the sense that 
a moral expression such as “morally right” is used with respect to a standard that is 
worse than a rival one given the functional role of moral expressions). They, thus, 
have more epistemic significance than disagreements that are always faultless such 
as e.g. disagreements about whether licorice is tasty. At the same time, the account 
allows for the possibility that moral inter-group disagreements can be faultless. They 
thus have less epistemic significance than disagreements that are never faultless such 
as moral inter-group disagreements (on a group-relativist view) or disagreements 
about the outcome of a calculation.
Like the strategies discussed above–giving up disagreement and explaining disa-
greement in terms of semantic relativism or hybrid-expressivism–explaining disa-
greement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation allows the moral relativist to avoid 
the dilemma. However, unlike these other strategies it manages to do so without giv-
ing up the view that moral disputes between members of different communities can 
constitute genuine moral disagreements that are epistemically significant. The main 
advantage of this strategy is thus that it leads to a nuanced understanding of the 
epistemic significance of moral inter-group disagreements. However, both proposals 
that vindicate genuine moral inter-group disagreement–explaining disagreement in 
terms of semantic relativism and hybrid-expressivism–could be further developed 
to incorporate a notion of disagreement as metalinguistic negotiation in addition to 
their semantic commitments. All it takes to do so is a distinction between what is 
21 They do so for reasons that are independent of the moral relativist’s problem with disagreement. In 
order to maintain that different moral systems conflict, the moral relativist must claim that they license 
different verdicts about the same topic. Moreover, as Velleman points out, in order not to collapse into 
nihilism–the view that no set of moral norms has the validity we usually take moral norms to have–
moral relativists have to give an account of what makes different sets of moral norms valid in their con-
text (Velleman 2015, 76). Arguing that moral systems serve a certain function is one way to meet these 
requirements.
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literally expressed and what is communicated. In this case, these proposals would 
be very similar to the view I am suggesting.22 The only remaining difference would 
be that, from the point of view of moral relativists already committed to semantic 
contextualism for moral judgments, these strategies would require adopting addi-
tional semantic commitments. While there might be independent reasons to under-
take semantic commitments of a relativist or hybrid-expressivist kind, they would no 
longer be necessary to account for disagreement.
Explaining moral inter-group disagreements in terms of metalinguistic negotia-
tion thus allows the moral relativist to explain (i) why moral disputes between mem-
bers of different communities constitute genuine disagreements, (ii) why engaging 
in these disputes has a point, and (iii) why moral inter-group disagreements do have 
at least some epistemic significance. In the next section, I will discuss an objection 
to the assumption that moral disagreement between members of different communi-
ties are in fact taken to have epistemic significance.
5  Are Moral Inter‑Group Disagreements Taken to Have Epistemic 
Significance?
The assumption that moral inter-group disagreements are in fact treated as having 
epistemic significance plays a crucial role for my argument. A challenge to this 
assumption comes from experimental philosophy. Sarkissian et al. have conducted 
a series of studies, in which subjects (all of which are students) are confronted with 
examples of severe moral transgressions. They are told that one of their classmates 
thinks that this act is morally wrong, but someone else disagrees with this. Then they 
are asked to indicate their agreement with the statement “Since your classmate and 
[the dissenter] have different judgments about this case, at least one of them must be 
wrong” on a scale from 1 (“disagree”) to 7 (“agree”) (Sarkissian et al., 2011, 487). 
Crucially, the study involves a variation in condition. Sometimes subjects are told 
that the dissenter is someone close to them (another classmate named “Sam”), other 
times they are told that it is someone from a very different culture (a member of the 
isolated tribe of the “Mamilons” that have preserved a traditional warrior culture) or 
even an extraterrestrial (a “Pentar”, whose main goal is to increase the total number 
of equilateral pentagons in the universe) (Sarkissian et al., 2011, 487f).
22 Adopting a different broadly pragmatic account of disagreement – such as e.g. Stephen Finlay’s 
“quasi-expressivism” (Finlay, 2014), Justin Khoo and Joshua Knobe’s account of disagreement in terms 
of incompatible proposals to update the conversational context (Khoo and Knobe, 2016), or accounts 
of disagreement referring to presuppositions of “commonality” or “superiority” (Zeman, 2017)–would 
not automatically lead to the same advantages. This is because the implication that the epistemic signifi-
cance of moral inter-group disagreement is nuanced (because it can but need not be faultless) depends 
on reference to the functional role of expressions and is thus unique to Plunkett and Sundell’s account 
of disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation. Of course, other pragmatic accounts of disagree-




The study finds that the intuition that disagreement indicates mistake is stronger 
when subjects are told that the dissenter is someone from their own environment 
and weaker when they are told it is someone from a very different context.23 This 
result is interpreted as showing that–in contrast to what prior experiments seemed 
to show–folk opinion does not vindicate moral objectivity, but instead is in line with 
moral relativism, at least when subjects are confronted with cases in which a judge 
comes from a very different context.24 These results seem to undermine the claim 
that moral disagreements are taken to have epistemic significance even across radi-
cally different contexts.
In response to this challenge, I want to suggest a different interpretation of the 
study, which better fits the data. The datapoints show that while assent to the state-
ment that disagreement implies mistake is significantly lower in cases in which the 
dissenter is from a very different context, it is still not low enough to unambigu-
ously indicate disagreement with the claim that disagreement indicates that a mis-
take has been made and agreement with its opposite–that disagreement is faultless. 
Instead, the answers are somewhere around the midpoint between 1 (“disagree”) and 
7 (“agree”).25 Rather than undermining the claim that moral disagreements across 
different contexts are taken to have epistemic significance, the details of the results, 
thus, support the view that the epistemic significance of moral inter-group disagree-
ment is nuanced.26 According to an account of moral inter-group disagreement in 
23 This proved to be the case when different subjects were provided with different conditions as well 
as when the same subjects were provided with different conditions side-by-side (Sarkissian et al., 2011, 
491f).
24 The topic of the study is thus moral objectivity, rather than moral disagreement. The study relies on 
intuitions about whether disagreement indicates mistake as an indicator of intuitions about objectivity. 
This, again, shows how close the connection between objectivity and the claim that disagreement must 
indicate mistake is sometimes taken to be. As a study about objectivity and relativism it faces the worry 
that even though subjects might have an intuition about disagreement, they might lack one about moral 
objectivity (Pölzler and Wright, 2019, 8). However, it provides more reliable data about subjects’ intui-
tions on whether disagreement implies mistake because this is what it directly tests for.
25 In the first study, which assigned different conditions to different subjects, the mean of answers for 
the other-culture condition was slightly above the midpoint of 4 (M = 4.4, SD = 2.05) and the mean of 
answers for the extraterrestrial condition was slightly below (M = 3.2, SD = 2.28) (Sarkissian et al., 2011, 
488f). The same study in a different setting led to similar results, but no exact numbers are given (Sark-
issian et  al., 2011, 490). In another study, in which subjects were presented with different conditions 
side-by-side, the mean of answers for the other-culture condition was slightly lower (M = 4.3, SD = 2.11) 
and the mean of answers for the extraterrestrial condition was slightly higher (M = 3.7, SD = 1.97) (Sark-
issian et al., 2011, 491). Further variations of the study dealt with the identity of the actor rather than the 
judge, comparison to non-moral cases and the exact interpretation of the phrase that “at least one of them 
must be wrong” (Sarkissian et al., 2011, 492–500). The results of these variants were not in tension with 
the results of the first set of studies.
26 In particular, the study that compared intuitions for moral disagreement with intuitions about disa-
greements about non-moral facts showed that disagreements about facts are taken to have more epis-
temic significance (Sarkissian et al., 2011, 495–97). More generally, because it entails that the epistemic 
significance of disagreements comes in degrees and differs for different domains, accounting for moral 
inter-group disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation is in line with the view that the “folk” 
are “metaethical pluralists”, in the sense that they have different intuitions about objectivity for different 
domains, which seems to be a lesson of experimental research (Pölzler and Wright, 2019).
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terms of metalinguistic negotiation, this is explained by the fact that it can but need 
not indicate that a mistake has been made.27
6  Conclusion
In addition to the claim that it makes it impossible to explain moral disagreement 
between members of different communities, a longstanding objection to moral rela-
tivism is that it makes constructive discourse between different moral traditions 
impossible (Wong, 2006, 76). Both of these worries go back to the idea that moral 
disagreements are ordinarily taken to have epistemic significance–they give us rea-
son to reconsider our position and engage in argument–that threatens to be lost on 
a relativist view of morality. While some moral relativists are happy to accept that 
there is no genuine moral disagreement between members of different communities 
and engaging in apparent conflicts is pointless, others have tried to accommodate the 
idea that there can be real disagreement between distant points of view that is worth 
pursuing within the boundaries of moral relativism. However, so far, these attempts 
have fallen short of recovering the epistemic significance of moral disagreement. 
I have argued that a novel approach–explaining moral inter-group disagreement as 
metalinguistic negotiation–can solve this problem.
I have started by explaining why accounting for moral disagreement between 
members of different communities constitutes a challenge to the coherence of moral 
relativism. Then, I have discussed three different strategies moral relativists have 
pursued to meet this challenge: giving up disagreement, arguing for faultless dis-
agreement based on semantic relativism, and explaining disagreement in terms of 
hybrid-expressivism. I have argued that all of these solutions come at a cost because 
they either give up disagreement or vindicate disagreement only without epis-
temic significance. Subsequently, I have argued that moral relativists are better off 
accounting for moral inter-group disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotia-
tion because this leads to a view of the epistemic significance of these disagreements 
as nuanced. Finally, I have addressed an objection to the assumption that moral disa-
greements between members of different communities are in fact taken to have epis-
temic significance. As I have pointed out, because it leads to a view on which dif-
ferent moral systems can, but need not be “equally valid”, the strategy of explaining 
moral inter-group disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation is only com-
patible with some versions of moral relativism, such as e.g. “functionalist” versions. 
However, because, in presenting an attractive picture of the epistemic significance 
of moral inter-group disagreements, this strategy allows the moral relativist to avoid 
27 Another possible interpretation of the data would be that subjects have no clear intuitions on the sub-
ject matter (cf. Pölzler and Wright, 2019, 8). If this is the case, it might be due to the unrealistic descrip-
tions of judges in the other-culture and extraterrestrial condition. In this case, the results of the study 
would not support an account of moral inter-group disagreement in terms of metalinguistic negotiation 
but could not ground an objection to the view either.
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some longstanding objections, this provides a pro tanto argument in favor of these 
versions of moral relativism.
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